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Teachers' Salary Differentials and the Quality 
of Educational Services: 
Récent Developments in Saskatchewan 
Peter Walmsley 
and 
Makoto Ohtsu 
This paper examines the relationship between teacher 
wage détermination and the distribution of teacher skill-mix, 
based on récent Saskatchewan data. The authors argue that 
while centralized bargaining produces more uniform wage 
scale throughout the Province, it does not necessariîy lead to 
the uniform distribution of teacher skill-mix among muni-
cipalités which is one of the most important conditions for 
the achievement of equality in the provision of educational 
services ; rather, it is the ability to pay of the individual school 
boards which has crucial bearings upon the composition of 
teacher skill-mix. 
In his study examining bargaining structure and geographical wage 
differentials of public school teachers in British Columbia, Alberta and 
Ontario, Douglas Muir observes that despite the decentralized bargaining 
structures, variations in the level of teachers' salaries between autonomous 
school units are generally quite small within thèse provinces, due to 
various financial, labour market 
and institutional factors ; local 
conditions hâve a very weak in-
fluence upon the level of salaries 
establish.* He suggests, therefore, 
that there is no économie rationale 
in decentralized bargaining and 
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that there is a definite trend towards greater centralization of teacher 
bargaining. 
Using Muir's discussion as a point of departure this paper will analyse 
wage differentials of elementary and secondary teachers between auto-
nomous school units in Saskatchewan and will then consider thèse data 
from the standpoint of the implications they hâve on the government's 
declared policy objective of achieving approximate equality in the pro-
vision of educational services throughout the various régions and localities 
of the province. This présent paper is the first, and in a sensé reports 
the pilot study phase, of a larger focus that hopefully will involve several 
related investigations into the impact of teacher wages, the structure of 
the compensation system, and the particulars of the collective bargaining 
process on the provision of educational services in Saskatchewan. Re-
latively little work of an empirical nature has been done in Saskatchewan 
which attemps to relate wages and the collective bargaining structures 
within which they are determined to the quality of educational services 
provided. Apart from raw, uninterpreted data, published mainly in go-
vernment reports, the vast majority of the published material which 
concerns itself with such issues consists of polemical spécial pleadings 
from the two levels of government, provincial and municipal, and from 
organizations representing the interest of trustées or teachers. 
There are certain unique features of the Saskatchewan situation 
that make it appealing as a justification for this type of investigation. 
In the relatively short period of less than a décade collective bargaining 
in Saskatchewan has moved from a decentralized system in which the 
local units were autonomous through « area » bargaining, to the présent 
system in which bargaining on major économie issues is done provincially 
by a team consisting, on the one hand, of provincial government repré-
sentatives and Saskatchewan School Trustées Association représentatives, 
and on the other hand, of représentatives of the Saskaktchewan Teachers 
Fédération. Also, even though Saskatchewan is a small province — the 
active teaching population is approximately eleven thousand — there 
are a number of identifiable variations that provide useful and meaningful 
bases for internai comparisons. There exist, for example, very obvious 
différences as between rural and urban communities. The relatively 
small size of the teacher population and the availability, with few defi-
ciencies, of an array of certain wage and employment data that go back 
for more than a décade is also of real practical usefulness in the furthennee 
of the séries of studies in process and contemplated by the authors. 
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In examining the wage differentials, Muir used as his basic wage 
data minimum and maximum scale rates for each classification grade 
(teacher class) among the various jurisdictions. This study uses average 
wages as measured by the total wage bill divided by the total number 
of teachers in each jurisdiction. This distinction is important. It is possible 
for wages to be administered in such a way that average wages increase 
measurably less in a given period than scale increases in the same period 
by the use, within the system, of a higher proportion of lower grade 
teachers. 
For individual teachers the salary schedule rather than the average 
wage level is significant because it indicates in an exact and fairly simple 
form the amount of salary due to each teacher in a given year, and 
allows each individual to see where he stands in the wage system relative 
to other individuals having différent académie qualifications and years 
of expérience. Such comparisons are of the type that individuals tend to 
be concerned about in a personal way. Therefore, the wage schedule is 
the basis generally used by teachers when they make what Arthur Ross 
has called « équitable comparison ». There is an attempt within the pro-
fession to eliminate scale differentials between geographical units as much 
as possible, so that teachers having the same qualifications obtain the 
same real wages regardless of the particular school unit in which they 
are employed. Professional teachers' associations especially tend to be 
committed to the principle that wage scale différences between locations, 
for given qualifications, should be eliminated or at most should not 
exceed an amount that could be justified by différences in living costs. In 
fact, élimination of geographical wage differentials has been one of the 
important goals of employée associations and trade unions generally.2 
Thus, comparison in terms of the wage scale tend to deal with equity 
problems associated with the supply side of the labor market. 
On the other hand, comparisons in terms of average wages, as we 
attempt in this study, are more valid when one intends to focus on the 
analysis of the cost aspect of a total system. Simply stated, an existence 
of geographical wage differentails measured this way implies that financial 
burden of éducation is différent among municipalities. It would seem 
2
 Concerning union policy on various kinds of wage differentials, see Clark 
KERR, « Wage Relationships — The Comparative Impact of Market and Power 
Forces, » in John Dunlop, éd., The Theory of Wage Détermination, New York, 
St. Martin's Press Inc., 1957, pp. 173-193. 
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reasonable to expect that différences in the average wages between com-
munities would reflect a comparable différence in the average array 
of teaching skills in thèse communities. In other words, such différences 
in average wages imply inequality existing between municipalities in terms 
of the quality of éducation which school children receive. It has frequently 
been stated that the achievement of equality in public éducation is one 
of the fundamental goals sought by démocratie governments. 3 The analysis 
we suggest should form a proper basis for an assessment of policies 
which address themselves to issues involving educational equality in the 
provision of elementary and secondary éducation in the province. 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF WAGE DETERMINATION 
In 1973 there were 1,032 elementary and secondary schools in 
Saskatchewan with 11,140 teachers employed in those schools. In terms 
of the number of employées, elemeentary and secondary éducation is 
by far the largest industry in Saskatchewan. The lowest level in the 
administrative hierarchy of primary and secondary éducation is the school 
district. There were 4,047 school districts as of June 30, 1973. Virtually 
ail school districts in rural areas hâve been integrated into school units. 
In 1973 there were 60 of thèse rural school units. School districts in 
urban areas hâve not been integrated into comparable units ; in each of 
the major eleven cities in the province there is at least one public school 
district and a Roman Catholic separate school district. In addition, there 
still remain a small number of school districts in both rural areas and 
in some small towns that hâve not as yet been incorporated into the 
larger units, but thèse are negligible in terms of the number of students 
enrolled and the number of teachers employed.4 
In each of the 60 rural units and 22 city districts there is a board 
of éducation. For ail practical purposes the board of éducation assumes 
the rôle of the employer and therefore is responsible for hiring and firing. 
Thèse boards are affiliated with the Saskatchewan School Trustées Asso-
ciation (SSTA), which has a 100% membership even though it is 
3
 For a discussion of the social and légal implications of inequities in public 
éducation in the U.S., see Robert D. REISCHAUER and Robert W. HARTMAN, 
Reforming School Finance, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1973, 
pp. 58-59. 
4 THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Province of Saskatchewan, Annual 
Report, 1972-73, Regina, 1973, pp. 63-66. 
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maintened on a voluntary basis. Also, under the Teaching Profession Act 
in Saskatchewan ail active teachers holding teaching certification are 
required to hold a membership in the Saskatchewan Teachers' Fédération 
(STF). This association is organized into local units each of which 
opérâtes at the level comparable to that of local boards. 
Between 1949 and 1968 under the Teachers' Salary Negotiation Act, 
wages were determined at the local level, that is, between the local school 
board and the local unit of STF. In 1968 the Teachers' Salary Agreement 
Act was passed which established a negotiation procédure based on area-
wide bargaining. Under the procédure outlined under that Act the entire 
gaining thereby integrating each local school board into one of the larger 
province was divided into 13 areas for the purpose of collective 
bargaining units. It should be pointed out that thèse area units had, as 
their function, the task of bargaining on behalf of ail school boards in 
the area, but bargaining agenda items were limited to a narrow range 
of interest issues, namely wage scales and certain administrative allowances. 
What was created was not a real level of administration at the area because 
the control of budgets remained at the local school board level. Under 
the Teachers Collective Bargaining Act of 1973, area bargaining, which 
had been in effect for a period of five years, was replaced by a System 
of provincial bargaining. Therefore, in 1973, a limited number of bar-
gaining items including salary scales and certain administrative allowances 
were negotiated at the Provincial level, while certain other issues were 
left to be negotiated between individual school boards and local units 
of the STF. 
Thus, in Saskatchewan although a two-level bargaining structure 
has emerged, negotiations in respect of main wage items hâve been 
centralized. This development has inevitably narrowed différences in wage 
scales among the various units and city districts. In fact, except for the 
northern areas which are treated as a spécial case, salaries for ail teachers 
in the Province are now determined within a single scale. As a resuit, 
teachers with the same qualifications and years of service will obtain the 
same wages regardless of which school board employs them. 
The détermination of the salary schedule for Saskatchewan teachers 
follows a rather simple formula. Ail teachers are classified into six 
classes ranging from Class I through Class VI. The classification criteria 
are based primarily upon the amount of post secondary éducation ; 
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therefore, a teacher with one year of post secondary éducation is placed 
in Class I, a teacher with two years of post secondary éducation is 
placed in Class II, and so on. Additionally, each of the six classes is 
divided into eleven « cells » ranging from 0 to 10, which reflect the 
teacher's length of service in any acceptable jurisdiction. Put differently, 
automatic progression in the form of an incrément is given to ail teachers 
every year until they hâve completed ten years of teaching. Afi:er the 
tenth year, further increases can only corne from upward shifts in the 
entire scale, payments in the form of administrative allowances or pro-
motion to a higher class based on improved qualification.5 
A comment hère on the division of responsibility for the financing 
of primary and secondary éducation in the Province is warranted. In 
1973 thee total operating expenditures of ail school boards in Saskat-
chewan were approximately 185 million dollars, of which approximately 
59% was allocated for teacher salaries. Also, of this amount, 85 million 
dollars was raised by local communities in the form of property taxes 
and 88 million dollars was given by the provincial government in the 
form of operating grants. The remaining 12 million dollars was raised 
in other ways including the income from fées. 6 
With this background we can now proceed to an examination of 
geographical wage differentials. Ail data used for the analyses in the 
subséquent sections hâve been obtained from various records kept by 
the Department of Education, Province of Saskatchewan. 
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN GEOGRAPHICAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
Data on total salary costs and number of teachers hâve been obtained 
for 78 units of analysis and for the 12 years between 1960 and 1964, 
and between 1966 and 1972. 7 Data for 1965 were not available. Among 
the 78 boards, 56 are rural units and 22 are city units. As mentioned 
5
 The structure of the salary system is such that a teacher who achieves higher 
qualifications and therefore is promoted would move, for example, from cell five 
in Class IV in June to cell six in Class V the following September. 
6 THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, op. cit., p. 68. 
7
 « Total salary cost » includes total wage bill and administrative allowances 
paid to the teachers in a supervisory position. Prior to 1970 both salary and 
employment figures include those of part-time teachers ; thereafter, those figures 
include those of full-time teachers only. 
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above there are 11 cities in Saskatchewan and in each of those cities 
there are public schools and Roman Catholic separate schools. Therefore, 
11 of the 22 units cover public schools and the remaining 11 cover se-
parate schools.8 By dividing the total salary cost by the total number 
of teachers we can obtain the average wage figure for each unit. 
First, we will examine the historical trend in wage differentials 
among 78 boards which will give us an overall picture. As the index 
of the geographical wage differentials we will use the coefficient of va-
riation which can be obtained by dividing the standard déviation of 78 
wages by the mean. Naturally, when the coefficient of variation is large, 
the geographical wage differentials are large. Table 1 shows the historical 
trend in overall differentials measured this way. 
TABLE 1 
Geographical Wage Differentials Among 78 Boards 
for 1960-1974, 1966-1972 
Coefficient of Coefficient of Coefficient of 
Year Variation (%) Year Variation (%) Year Variation (%) 
1960 12.1 1964 11.0 1969 7.5 
1961 12.4 1966 8.8 1970 7.7 
1962 11.5 1967 8.5 1971 7.1 
1963 11.2 1968 8.6 1972 7.4 
It is apparent from Table 1 that the overall geographical wage 
differentials hâve narrowed during the twelve years selected. The index 
has declined from 12.1% in 1960 to 7.4% in 1972. The table indicates 
that the declining tendency has been rather steady. The change in the 
locus of bargaining from the local to the area level which took place 
in 1968 appears to hâve had little if any effect on geographical wage 
differentials. 
8
 Actual number of boards among the cities is greater than 22 because in 
some cities there are more than one public and/or separate school boards, for 
example, one for elementary schools and one for secondary schools. For the 
purpose of this analysis, if there are more than one board, figures for those boards 
are combined into one so that for each city there is one unit of analysis covering 
public schools and one unit of analysis covering separate schools respectively. 
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Next, we will examine differentials between three sub-groups, that 
is, rural unit boards, city public boards, and city separate boards. For 
each of those three sub-groups an employment weighted average wage 
cost is calculated by dividing the total wage bill paid to teachers in each 
sub-group by the number of teachers in the respective sub-group. The 
wage differentials are calculated as percentage ratios of average wage 
cost of city separate schools to that of city public schools, and average 
wage cost of rural unit schools to that of city public schools respectively. 
Table 2 shows historical trends in wage differentials among three sub-
groups thu.s calculated. 
Table 2 indicates that among the three sub-groups city public school 
boards hâve been paying the highest wages for the entire period. Between 
city separate school boards and rural unit school boards the latter used 
TABLE 2 
Geographical Wage Differentials Between Three Sub-Groups 
(City Public Schools, City Separate Schools and Rural Unit Schools) 
for 1960-1974, 1966-1972 
AVERAGE WAGE COST 
City Separate 
(2) 
Rural Units 
(3) 
(2) 
O) X 100 (1) 
$ 3447 $ 4209 67.4% 82.4% 
3659 4318 68.7% 81.1% 
3820 4484 70.6% 82.9% 
3952 4616 70.7% 82.6% 
4378 4858 73.3% 81.3% 
5874 5677 87.3% 84.4% 
6591 6292 88.0% 84.1% 
6774 6524 89.4% 86.1% 
7775 7246 91.2% 85.0% 
7982 7530 91.6% 86.4% 
8892 8292 91.7% 85.6% 
9937 9387 93.6% 88.4% 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
City Public 
(1) 
$ 5111 
5321 
5405 
5589 
5976 
6721 
7482 
7576 
8518 
8713 
9692 
10615 
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to pay higher wages between 1960 and 1964 ; thereafter, however, their 
relationship has been reversed. Also, while differentials between city 
public and rural schools hâve narrowed rather moderately during the 
period, differentials between city public and city separate schools hâve 
narrowed substantially (from 67% in 1960 to 94% in 1972). 
Finally we will examine wage differentials within each of the three 
sub-groups. In Table 3 differentials are expressed in terms of the coef-
ficient of variation. 
TABLE 3 
Geographical Wage Differentials Within 11 City Public School Systems, 
11 City Separate School Systems, and 56 Rural Unit School Systems, 
for 1960-1974, 1966-1972 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
v Public City Separate Rural Units 
4.7 14.1 4.9 
3.7 17.8 4.5 
5.6 15.1 4.9 
3.4 14.2 5.2 
4.6 13.8 5.4 
8.5 14.4 4.7 
7.6 12.7 5.2 
7.4 14.3 4.9 
7.4 11.4 5.1 
5.7 11.8 4.6 
5.0 9.5 4.4 
4.5 10.7 4.4 
Table 3 shows several things : in the city public boards wage dif-
ferentials were almost constant between 1960 and 1964, suddenly in-
creased in 1966 and gradually declined after that. Among the city 
separate boards there is a rather consistent narrowing tenderxy, and 
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among the rural unit boards the differentials hâve becn almost constant 
over the entire period. The magnitude of differentials Jias been the 
biggest among the city separate boards and the smallest among the 
rural unit boards since 1966 ; prior to that the differentials are smallest 
among the city public boards. An obvious reason for the fact that the 
differentials are wider among city separate boards is that some boards 
include only elementary schools within their jurisdiction. To the extent 
that the average wage level of secondary school teachers is higher re-
flecting their higher qualifications, an inclusion of those boards covering 
only elementary schools will bias the resuit by increasing the differential 
index. 
At this section we hâve attempted to identify the historical trends 
in geographical wage differentials. Our findings will be summerized as 
follows : 
(1) Overall geographical wage differentials hâve been narrowing. 
(2) Differentials between city public and rural unit Systems hâve been 
narrowed moderately. 
(3) Differentials between city public and city separate Systems nar-
rowed substantially around 1966 and since then hâve been nar-
rowed consistently. 
(4) Within the rural unit System differentials hâve been constant and 
the magnitude of the differentials has been small. 
(5) Within the city public system differentials widened suddenly around 
1966 and thereafter the magnitude of differentials has been nar-
rowing. 
(6) Within the city separate system differentials hâve been consistently 
narrowing although the magnitude of differentials has been the 
biggest among the three sub-groups. 
In conclusion, wage differentials hâve been narrowing both between 
the three sub-groups and within each of those sub-groups over the entire 
period, especially since 1966. However, the fact that the narrowing ten-
dencies in the various types of geographical wage differentials since 1966 
tend to be rather graduai and small in magnitude seems to suggest that 
the change in the structure of collective bargaining from the local to area 
level which took place in 1968 has not contributed substantially to those 
narrowing tendencies. In the subséquent section, then, we will attempt 
to ident;fy and analyse those factors which hâve bearings on geographical 
wage differentials of Saskatchewan teachers. 
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DETERMINING FACTORS OF GEOGRAPHICAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
The direct method to examine the reasons for the narrowing ten-
dencies in various forms of geographical wage differentials, which we 
observed in the previous section, would be as follows : to dérive theoreti-
cally the critical factors involved in wage détermination ; to construct a 
differential index, coefficient of variation, for example, for each of those 
variables and for each of the twelve years ; and to regress the dépendent 
wage variable against a group of independent variables. Put differently, 
multiple régression analysis using a set of time séries data will give us 
a direct answer to the question of what were the determining factors of 
geographical wage differentials between 1960 and 1972. 
Unfortunately, however, time séries data for the entire period are 
not readily available for the independent variables.9 Most data are 
available only for the récent years. In the foliowing analysis, therefore, 
we will use the cross-sectional data rather than the time séries data. Each 
variable is expressed in terms of the level that is the actual value rather 
than in terms of the differential index. 
We hâve stated several times that geographical differentials in 
teacher wages are largely a reflection of the differentials in their quality. 
This is based upon the so-called « compétitive hypothesis » which states 
that under perfect compétition both in the product market and in the 
labor market, any employer will pay the same price as any other employer 
for a given grade of labor. In other words, wage differentials are possible 
only among what J. S. Mill calls « noncompeting groups, » or to pa-
raphase Melvin Reder, wage differentials among différent groups of 
people are a reflection of différences in their « skill-mix ». 10 In the first 
place, therefore, we would like to examine to what extent geographical 
wage differentials are affected by the skill-mix of teachers in each board. 
As discussed earlier teacher job classification is made based upon 
only two factors, i.e., the length of post-secondary éducation and the 
length of service of the teachers. It may well be that in addition to thèse 
two factors several factors including innate ability and motivation affect 
9
 A discussion on the nature of independent variables will be done shortly. 
M Melvin REDER, « Wage Differentials : Theory and Measurement, » National 
Bureau of Economie Research, Aspects of Labor Economies, Princeton, N.J., Prince-
ton University Press, 1962, p. 276. 
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the actual teaching performance. However, in the absence of readily 
available data on those behavioral variables, we will use only éducation 
and length of service variables. For the purpose of computation thèse 
two variables are measured by the percentage of teachers with a four-
year degree and above, and the average length of service of the teachers 
in each board respectively. n If we stipulate a linear relations among the 
variables we hâve the following multiple régression équation : 
W = a + WE + b2S + e (1) 
where W = average wages 
E = percentage of degree teachers 
S = average length of service 
e = an error term. 
The above équation (1) is estimated for a set of cross-sectional 
data for each of the three years, 1970, 1971 and 1972. Cross-sectional 
data are available both at the local administrative units and for the area 
bargaining units. Although collective bargaining was done at the area 
level in thèse years, it does not détermine the distribution of the teachers 
among différent boards; it is the individual board which does the hiring 
and firing. Also, disaggregated data are superior to aggregated data in 
that variations with a sub-group may be cancelled out by each other when 
the data are aggregated and each sub-group becomes the data unit. For 
thèse reasons, analyses are done at the local board level. Data are or-
ganized to cover (1) total boards, (2) rural unit boards, (3) total city 
boards, (4) city public boards only, and (5) city separate boards only. 
The total number of boards is 82 including among them 60 rural unit 
boards and 22 city boards. Of the city boards 11 are public and the 
remaining 11 are separate boards. Table 4 summarizes the findings. 
It is évident from the above table that no matter how the data are 
grouped, the two independent variables, taken together, explain a sub-
stantial portion of variations in the average wage level in each of the 
three years ; R2 values, ranging from 0.73 to 0.96, are ail significant at 
11
 The average length of service of the teachers in each board is based upon 
the ten service incréments that form the part of the structure of the salary schedule 
as discussed earlier. This means that the maximum years of service identified in 
this study is ten. 
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TABLE 4 
Régression Testing for Effects of Education (E) and Service (S) 
for Différent School Boards in 1970, 1971 and 1972 
Year Case Const. Education (E) Service (S) R2 
1970 1 3123.3 46.6 342.6 0.76 
(2.0) (35.7) 
2 3144.9 36.1 383.1 0.84 
(2.7) (33.0) 
3 3684.0 51.8 247.5 0.91 
(3.9) (99.7) 
4 2748.7 55.0 228.1* 0.77 
(11.0) (212.7) 
5 4543.5 46.4 142.0* 0.95 
(3.9) (103.8) 
1971 1 3839.4 43.5 387.1 0.74 
(2.0) (38.7) 
2 3442.5 35.2 472.8 0.82 
(2.9) (37.4) 
3 4587.4 44.6 298.0 0.95 
(3.0) (75.9) 
4 5308.8 52.8 152.4* 0.86 
(9.7) (154.9) 
5 4882.4 38.8 274.4 0.95 
(3.5) (79.8) 
1972 1 3750.2 46.3 520.0 0.87 
(2.4) (46.4) 
2 3707.0 42.9 535.7 0.73 
(4.0) (54.4) 
3 4063.3 42.6 528.0 0.96 
(3.4) (84.1) 
4 3809.9 53.4 471.1 0.94 
(6.2) (77.2) 
5 3750.6 41.4 583.9 0.92 
(5.8) (159.0) 
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. 
* means no statistical significance at the 5% test level ; ail others are significant 
at the 1 % level. 
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the 1% test level. This means that those boards characterized by a 
relatively high portion of degree teachers and also a high average length 
of service tend to hâve a high wage level. 
Between the two independent variables the éducation variable seems 
to hâve a stronger explanatory power throughout the years ; the length 
of service variable has turned out to be non-significant at the 5% test 
level in three out of fifteen cases. However, over the three years the 
length of service variable seems to hâve increased its explanatory power 
so that in 1972 it is significant at the 1% test level in each of the five 
cases. To the extent that thèse two variables represent teaching skills 
the above results confirm our contention that geographical wage dif-
ferentials imply an existenc of inequality in the quality of éducation 
between municipalities. 
Further to the above analysis, relationships between average wages, 
éducation and the length of service hâve been compared between the 
three sub-groups, that is, rural unit boards, city public boards, and city 
separate boards. The following Table 5 shows the mean values of thèse 
three variables for the three groups in 1970, 1971 and 1972. 
TABLE 5 
Average Wages, Education and Length of Service for City Public Boards, 
City Separate Boards and Rural Unit Boards in 1970, 1971 and 1972 
Wages ($) Education (%) Service (yrs) 
1970 City Public 
City Separate 
Rural Unit 
1971 City Public 
City Separate 
Rural Unit 
1972 City Public 
City Separate 
Rural Unit 
8713 
7982 
7530 
9692 
8892 
8292 
10615 
9937 
9387 
54.7 7.7 
50.2 7.3 
34.9 7.9 
60.3 7.6 
50.5 6.9 
36.9 7.4 
63.6 7.6 
51.9 6.7 
39.2 6.9 
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In ail three years average wages are the highest in the city public 
boards followed by the city separate boards ; average wages in the rural 
unit boards are the lowest. Exactly the same relationship exists for the 
amount of éducation, while the length of service shows a différent 
tendency. Rural unit boards, which are the lowest in wages in ail three 
years, are the highest in the length of service in 1970 and the second 
highest in 1971 and 1972. Thèse figures suggest that wage differentials 
among thèse three groups are largely a reflection of differentials in degree 
teacher ratio ; length of service does not seem to play any significant 
rôle. 
Table 5 also indicates that there is a substantial amount of différence 
in the degree teacher ratio between urban and rural boards ; teachers 
with a university degree are heavily concentrated in the city boards, 
especially the city public boards. Also, the skewed distribution of the 
degree teachers does not seem to hâve improved over the years. If we 
compare the city public boards and the rural unit boards, for example, 
the percentage degree teacher ratio increased by 8.9 percentage points 
in the former between 1970 and 1972, while it increased by only 4.3 
percentage points in the latter. The same thing can be said about the 
length of service which has a declining tendency over the years in ail 
three groups. In the rural unit boards the average length of service 
declined by one year between 1970 and 1972, while in the city public 
boards it declined by only one-tenth of a year. 
The above finding suggest that educational inequality does exist 
between municipalities in gênerai and between rural and urban (public) 
schools in particular and that the rural-urban inequality has not been 
improved over the years. Our next task, then, would be to examine the 
reasons for the skewed distribution of teacher skill-mix among muni-
cipalities. 
TEACHER SKILL-MIX AND SCHOOL FINANCE 
From our expérience with the private sector it may be hypothesized 
that an employer's ability to pay détermines the skill-mix of the labor 
force which he employs. That is, firms with a higher ability to pay should 
find it advantageous to employ superior personnel because thèse personnel 
are more productive thus contribute more to the firm's profits.12 By the 
i2 Melvin REDER, op. cit., p. 292. 
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same token, the board having higher ability to pay may employ teachers 
who are, on the average, more qualified and experienced, thereby pro-
viding better éducation for the students within its jurisdiction, while the 
board having a lower ability to pay simply cannot afford to do so. 
In order to test the above hypothèses both éducation and the length 
of service variables are regressed against two alternative proxies of the 
ability to pay, the total operating revenue per pupil and the local school 
taxes per pupil in each board. If we assume a linear relation between 
the dépendent and independent variables, we hâve the following simple 
régression équations : 
E = a! + biR + e x (2) 
E = a2 + b2T 4- e2 (3) 
S = a3 + b3R + e3 (4) 
S = a4 + b4T + e4 (5) 
where W = average wages 
E = percentage ratio of degree teachers 
S = average length of service 
R = total operating revenue per pupil 
T = local school taxes per pupil 
e, = an error term. 
The above four équations are estimated for cross-sectional data 
covering (1) 60 rural unit boards, and (2) 22 city boards for each of 
the three years, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The following Table 6 summarizes 
TABLE 6 
Coefficient of Détermination (R2) for Corrélations 
Between Skill-Mix and Ability to Tay 
Year Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) 
Rural City Rural City Rural City Rural City 
1970 (-) .036 .367** (-) .006 .441** .014 .194* (-) .005 .351** 
1971 ( - ) .083* .435** (-)0.10 .616** .032 .045 .000 .200* 
1972 (-) .106* .411** (-) .003 .548** .061* .087 (-) .001 .357** 
( —) means négative b-coefficient. 
* means statistical significance at the 5% test level. 
** means statistical significance at the 1% test level. 
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the results. Table 6 gîves us an overall picture where ability to pay is 
significantly correlated to teacher skill-mix among the city boards while 
it is not among the rural boards. 
More specifically, among the city boards local school taxes per pupil 
seems to be a better proxy of the ability to pay than operating revenue 
per pupil. In every case the local school tax proxy causes a higher R2 
value ; in two out of three cases the operating revenue proxy is not 
significantly correlated to the length of service variable. This means that 
boards which can raise high éducation taxes locally tend to hire more 
qualified and more experienced teachers. 
Why is it that local school taxes is a better proxy than operating 
revenue ? Hère, we hâve to discuss the rôle of the government grant. As 
mentioned earlier, responsibility for the financing of primary and se-
condary éducation is, on the average, almost evenly shared by the local 
board of éducation and the provincial government. The stated govern-
ment's grant policy is to promote equity in financing and equality of 
opportunity in éducation by subsidizing boards with limited financial re-
sources. 13 Therefore, we should expect a high négative corrélation bet-
ween the amount of the government grant and the amount of local school 
taxes which in turn is significantly correlated to skill-mix. Since the 
government grant occupies on the average close to one-half of the total 
operating revenue, it is quite reasonable that the total operating revenue 
has a lower corrélation with skill-mix than local school taxes. 
In order to substantiate the above reasoning simple corrélation 
has been calculated between local school taxes and government grants. 
The simple corrélation coefficient is —.35 in 1970, — .52 in 1971 and 
— .57 in 1972. As expected ail hâve négative values, although the ma-
gnitude is not as large as one might expect them to be. 
In summary, our hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
skill-mix and ability to pay has been supported for the city boards. For 
the rural boards we hâve an entirely différent picture ; generally, there 
seems to exist a weakly négative relationship between skill-mix and 
ability to pay. Of course, this is contrary to our expectation. Why is it 
possible that « poor » communities appear to be equally or even more 
13 THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, op. cit., p. 41 . 
602 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 4 
able to hire more qualified and experienced teachers than « rich » com-
munities ? Two explanations seem plausible. 
The first one is that there may be a trade-off relationship between 
skill-mix and the class size. Put differently, school boards may be able 
to control, to a certain extent, teacher skill-mix by manipulating pupil-
teacher ratio. Therefore, some schools might prefer to hire more qualified 
and experienced teachers simply by increasing class size, while some 
other schools especially in rural areas may hâve no alternative other 
than to hire less qualified and experienced teachers due to small class 
size. The second explanation is that there may be a trade-off relationship 
between wage cost and other costs of éducation. Therefore, by allocating 
a high proportion of the total operating revenue to the wage cost, even 
a poor community might be able to hire more qualified and experienced 
teachers. 
In formulating a hypothesis we need not treat thèse two trade-off 
relationships in the either/or sensé. They can be combined into one 
équation so that we can examine the relative importance of thèse two 
factors. If we assume a linear relationship among the variables, the 
following multiple régression équations can be formulated : 
E = a! + buPr + b12Wr + d (6) 
S = a2 + b2iPr + b22Wr + e2 (7) 
where Pr = percentage pupil teacher ratio 
Wr = percentage wage cost ratio. 
The above two équations are estimated for cross-sectional data covering 
60 rural unit boards for each of the three years, 1970, 1971 and 1972. 
The following Table 7 summarizes the results. Taken together, the pupil-
teacher ratio and the wage cost ratio are significantly correlated to the 
éducation variable at the 1% level in each of the three years and to the 
length of service variable at the 1% level in 1971 and at the 5% level 
in 1970 and 1972. Generally speaking, thèse findings seem to be con-
sistent with the hypothesis. In closer examination, however, when éduc-
ation is taken as the dépendent variable, the sign of the partial cor-
relation coefficient of the pupil-teacher ratio variable turns out to be 
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TABLE 7 
Régression Testing for Effects of Pupil-Teacher Ratio and Wage Cost Ratio 
for Rural Unit Boards in 1970, 1971 and 1972 
Dépendent 
Variable Year Const. P-T Ratio WC Ratio R2 
Education 1970 14.586 -0.076 
(0.763) 
0.432** 
(0.126) 
0.170** 
1971 47.948 -1.472* 
(0.816) 
0.408** 
(0.112) 
0.213** 
1972 52.876 -1.752* 
(0.893) 
0.419** 
(0.116) 
0.242** 
Service 1970 4.045 0.169** 
(0.063) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.111* 
1971 2.741 0.236** 
(0.064) 
- 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.193** 
1972 4.040 0.170** 
(0.071) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
0.116* 
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. 
* means statistical significance at the 5% test level. 
** means statistical significance at the 1% test level. 
négative in every case ; in fact, in two out of three cases they are « si-
gnificantly » négative at the 5% test level. The wage cost ratio variable 
is positive and highly sifnificant in every case, as originally expected. 
Also, the pupil-teacher ratio variable is significantly correlated to the 
dépendent length of service variable at the 1% test level in every case, 
while the wage cost ratio variable has no significant corrélation in any 
year. 
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Thèse findings suggest that the boards having a higher degree teacher 
ratio are able to hire more expensive teachers, who on the average 
teach smaller size classes, by allocating a higher proportion of the total 
operating revenue to the wage cost. Also, the boards having more ex-
perienced teachers are able to hire those teachers by increasing class size. 
When teacher skill-mix is measured by a combination, in one way or 
another, of éducation and the length of service, the pupil-teacher ratio, 
which is negatively correlated to éducation and positively correlated to 
the length of service, would tend to cancel each other. Overall, then, 
wage cost ratio rather than pupil-teacher ratio seems to be a better 
explanatory variable of teacher skill-mix for the rural boards. 
A closer examination of the raw data tends to support the above 
findings. As mentioned earlier, teacher salaries are the biggest expend-
iture item which occupies approximately 60% of the total operating 
revenue. Other items include plant opération, debt charges, pupil trans-
portation, and payments to other Systems.14 Among thèse items the last 
two need spécial attention. That is, there is a large variation in the 
amount of thèse two items among rural unit boards. Some boards spend 
a considérable portion of their total operating revenue on thèse two items, 
while other s do not spend much. 
Probably, such factors as the density as well as distribution of 
student population, and the closeness to cities and towns affect the 
amount of expenditure on thèse two items. This tends to understate 
the « true » ability to pay of those boards which do not hâve to spend 
much on thèse two items. In view of this, the original ability to pay 
hypothesis is re-tested with the percentage degree teacher ratio as the 
dépendent variable and the total operating revenue net of pupil trans-
portation costs and payments to other Systems, which might be called 
« net ability to pay », as the independent variable. This simple régression 
équation is estimated for cross-sectional data covering 60 rural unit 
boards for each of the three years, 1970, 1971 and 1972. 
Obtained R2 values are .085 for 1970, .079 for 1971 and .114 
for 1972. Corresponding F values are 5.38, 4.96 and 7.49 respectively. 
Thèse findings suggest that although the new (or net) ability to pay 
14
 « Payments to other Systems » are made by one board to another when 
some students in the first board opt to attend a school under the jurisdiction of 
the second board, which usually is a city board. 
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proxy « explains » on the average only 10% or even less of the total 
variation in the dépendent éducation variable, it is statistically significant 
at the 5% test level in 1970 and 1971 and at the 1% test level in 1972. 
Overall then, we can say that boards' ability to pay, when measured 
properly, does affect their teacher skill-mix not only among the city 
boards but also among the rural unit boards. 
Finally, net ability to pay also explains a large discrepancy in degree 
teacher ratio between rural and urban boards. For example, in 1972 
the total operating revenue per pupil of the unit boards is higher than 
that of the urban boards ; however, in terms of the net ability to pay, 
the city public boards are the highest ($764) followed by the city 
separate boards ($684) and the rural unit boards are the lowest ($634) 
among the three. 15 Thèse figures match very well to those of the degree 
teacher ratio in the same year in Table 5. This tendency is consistent 
for the earlier two years, 1971 and 1970. 
SUMMARY 
As Muir predicted in his article, for the past several years there has 
been a definite trend towards greater centralization of the détermination 
of teachers' salary in Saskatchewan. As a resuit of the statutory change 
in 1973, we now hâve only one province-wide bargaining as far as 
major salary items are concerned. This means that an equity objective 
of the teachers' associations has now been achieved in Saskatchewan 
at least in respect of the bargaining format. We hâve attempted in this 
study to demonstrate that equity in the wage rates does not necessarily 
lead to éducation equality among localities. 
First, geographical wage differentials hâve been measured for the 
past twelve years. Since geographical wage differentials are partially a 
reflection of skewed distribution of teacher-skill mix and partially a re-
flection of wage scale differentials, we expect wage differentials to 
narrow over the years reflecting increased unification of wage scales. If 
15
 This is so because city boards spend, on the average, little on pupil trans-
portation and payments to other Systems. For one thing, city schools are located 
within a walking distance of students, and then, there is rarely a transfer of 
students from a city school to a rural school. Thus, total operating revenue per 
pupil tends to understate the « true » ability to pay of the city boards relative 
to the rural boards. 
606 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 4 
wage differentials hâve been widening in spite of the institutional setting 
favorable for wage uniformity, that is a reason enough to believe that 
distribution of teacher skill mix has become more skewed. As expected, 
various kinds of geographical wage differentials hâve been found to be 
narrowing over the years. The fact that the narrowing tendencies are 
graduai suggest that throughout the entire period there was an increasing 
practice of the so-called « pattern bargaining » among the bargaining units. 
Next, an analysis has been done to examine the extent to which 
teacher skill-mix, measured by the degree teacher ratio and the length 
of service, affects average wages. Based upon cross-sectional data of 
1970, 1971 and 1972 it has been found that a substantial portion of 
the total variation in average wages can be explained by thèse two 
factors, especially by the éducation variable. Also, the distribution of 
the degree teacher ratio between rural and urban boards is far more 
skewed than the comparable wage figures suggest. Between 1970 and 
1972 rural-urban differentials in the degree teacher ratio hâve not been 
narrowed. Although data for earlier years is not available we may be 
able to infer from the above that during the twelve-year period geo-
graphical differentials in teacher skill mix hâve not been narrowed as 
much as the comparable wage differential figures. From the standpoint 
of educational equality, this large discrepancy in teacher skill-mix, rather 
than wage differentials per se, is a more important issue. 
Therefore, the last section of this paper has been devoted to the 
examination of the reasons for the uneven distribution of teacher skill-
mix. It has been hypothesized that teacher skill-mix is determined lar-
gely by boards' ability to pay. For the city boards ability to pay, measured 
by local school taxes, has a significantly high corrélation with both 
éducation and length of service variables. For the rural boards « net » 
ability to pay, measured by the total operating revenue minus pupil 
transportation costs and payments to other Systems, is significantly cor-
related to the éducation variable. The net ability to pay also explains 
a large discrepancy in degree teacher ratio between rural and urban 
boards. Thèse findings support the hypothesis that the boards' ability 
to pay has important bearings upon their teacher skill-mix. 
The policy implication of this study is clear : In order to achieve 
more uniform distribution of teacher skill-mix, which in turn will con-
tribute to the universal goal of educational equality, ability to pay of 
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the individual boards has to become more uniform. Indeed, under the 
province-wide bargaining, local conditions do not affect the level of 
salaries established. But they do affect teacher skill-mix so long as the 
individual boards raise school taxes and do hiring and firing of teachers. 
The Provincial Government is in a position to mitigate local différences 
in ability to pay by manipulating its grants policy in such a way that 
more grants are given to the boards which employ teachers with lower 
qualifications. In this sensé, the magnitude of négative corrélation between 
local school taxes and government grants, which is presently in the order 
of — .50 or so for both urban and rural boards, seems to be still low. 
SOME COMMENTS ON TEACHER WAGE PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
It has been mentioned in this paper that teachers' associations ge-
nerally adopt as an equity objective a single salary scale within their 
respective jurisdictions. In practice this typically amounts to a graduai 
modification of existing scales toward a single, desired mode to the 
extent that particular bargaining situations make practicable. The value 
assumption underlying this position is that it is équitable and just that a 
similar amount of wages be paid for similar teacher training and ex-
périence, regardless of the locality in which a teacher works. 
In Saskatchewan, as any other province, it is stated government 
policy to provide equal educational opportunity for its young citizens 
irrespective of the particular locality in which they réside. Consistent 
with this policy, the government has revised its educational grants formula 
in its continuing attempt to approach a reasonable approximation of equal 
quality of educational services provided and has also brought about 
province-wide teacher-trustee bargaining on the central économie items as 
well as the single, province-wide wage scale. 
However, it should be pointed out that when the Saskatchewan 
Government and the Saskatchewan Teachers' Fédération refer to the 
single salary scale as being équitable, they are referring to, and endorsmg, 
two distinctly différent values. The government apparently assumes that 
a single scale will facilitate the distribution throughout the province of 
approximately equally paid and therefore approximately equally qua-
lified teachers. Such a distribution of skills is, of course, necessary if 
equality in the provision of educational services is to be achieved. For 
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the Government, therefore, the term 'equity' has référence to a value 
concerning the quality of services provided. For the Teachers' Fédération, 
on the other hand, the term 'equity' refers to the equality of financial 
compensation to individual teachers, or more properly to certain classes 
of teachers, on similar amounts of investments in formai training and 
expérience. 
This notion of 'equity' held by the teachers is achicved within the 
logics of salary scale itself. At least up to the eleventh year the two 
major pay-out dimensions of the scale are level of formai training and 
years of teaching expérience. Admittedly the magnitudes of the relational 
values within the catégories of qualification levels, and within the caté-
gories of expérience, and between thèse sets of catégories, can be changed 
through negotiation ; but the nature of the process and the basis of 
accommodation reflects judgements concerning what is proper and what 
is practicable within the teacher labor market. 
However, there is no necessary logical connection between centralized 
bargaining or the use of a province-wide salary scale and the government's 
stated objective of the provision of generally comparable levels of educ-
ational services throughout the province. What emerged quite clearly 
from the présent study, is that in spite of a salary scale that tends toward 
a common mode, or even within a province-wide scale, individual school 
boards are able to manage the skill-mix in such a way as to perpetuate 
a disequitable level of teaching skills in ways and for reasons that are 
beyond the scope of this présent paper but will be treated as the central 
focus of study which will be completed at a later time. 
From the standpoint of public policy, therefore, it must be em-
phasized that the employment bargain encompasses a myriad of particular 
items that hâve significance in the market, of which perhaps the most 
important is the wage component, but the wage factor in itself is not so 
dominant as to distribute resources in such a way as to reflect precisely 
the values built into the pay structure. In fact, of course, if the objectives 
of approximate equality of provision of educational services was a serious 
one, and if teaching excellence were accepted as an important factor in 
this equality, then presumably the wage structure would hâve to allow 
fo^ différences in pay for similar amount of training and exper"ence 
so as to balance nonwage factors in the total employment bargain. 
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Within the field of public éducation various fairly autonomous 
administrative and human sub-systems can be identified. Thèse sub-
systems, which, to use contemporary conceptualization and terminology 
can be referred to as games ; each has a particular set of actors or 
players ; each has rules that reflect attitudes, values, customs that are 
developed in each game ; and each has a particular and unique set of 
objectives of goals, including often the notion of some one player winning 
or losing more than some other player. Within the area of interest 
touched on by this paper two such sub-systems or games are dominant. 
One is the budgetary game in which the central players are provincial 
government officiais, municipal government officiais and trustées. The 
other game is that of collective bargaining, which in Saskatchewan has 
as the central players provincial government officiais, représentatives of 
the Saskatchewan School Trustées Association and représentatives of the 
Saskatchewan Teachers' Fédération, and includes also in a lesser rôle 
trustées, teachers, and very occasionally in particular situations and for 
particular purposes students and their parents. 
Thèse games, though related in an overall way at a fairly high 
governmental level are pursued as quite separate activities even though 
each game can inflict certain constraints on the other. But by and large 
the objectives are différent, and because the actors are différent so are 
the final décisions which take the form of accommodations because they 
are essentially processes of competing interest resolved by power. This 
sort of analysis is used to underscore the fact that value notions such 
as equality of educational services, quality of teacher skill, efficient use 
of educational resources are going to become semantically loaded ac-
cording to value of the polemic or, ultimately their power utility to each 
set of actors in each game. Even agreements between actors within a 
particular game or among actors across game lines do not necessarily 
mean a commonality of understanding and labelling ; rather it could 
mean merely an alliance, a willingness to endorse similar statements 
of value for some particular end that might be shared or even might, 
for reasons of public image, merely provide the appearance of agree-
ment. 
The point of ail this is that if certain social goals are set up as 
objectives, the évaluation of success, or absence of it, in accomplishing 
those goals, must be made on the basis of direct, unbiased, procedurally 
proper measures. It is hazardous, naive, or even deceitful to claim as a 
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valid measurement of the success of a particular public policy, testimonials 
from one or more of the players having a direct personal or institutional 
interest in the- way a game is played or in its outcome. 
A lot has been written on skill, wage equity, quality of service, and 
administrative efficiency in the field of public éducation. This study begins 
an attempt to establish a few rather modest measurement indices based 
entirely on the empirical data available for Saskatchewan. 
Les écarts de salaire chez les enseignants et la qualité 
des services d'éducation : le cas de la Saskatchewan 
Cet article a pour objet d'analyser la structure des négociations et des 
échelles de salaire dans les commissions scolaires en Saskatchewan en regard de 
mesures destinées à assurer l'équivalence des services éducatifs dans l'ensemble 
de la province. On tient pour avéré, semble-t-il, que le paiement de traite-
ments à peu près uniformes soit de nature à permettre d'avoir un personnel 
enseignant de valeur à peu près égale où que les enseignants se trouvent dans la 
province. Une répartition égale des compétences est naturellement essentielle pour 
assurer partout des services qui s'équivalent. C'est cette considération qui a été 
à l'origine de la centralisation de la négociation collective en Saskatchewan. Ce 
que nous soutenons dans cet article, c'est que la centralisation des mécanismes 
de négociation ne conduit pas nécessairement à une répartition uniforme des 
compétences. Les recherches expérimentales sur ce sujet comprennent trois parties. 
En premier lieu, on a évalué les différentiels de salaire au cours d'une 
période de douze ans entre 1960 et 1964 et entre 1966 et 1972. On y a découvert 
que, au fur et à mesure que les années s'écoulaient, les écarts allaient se rétré-
cissant et que les différentiels de salaire, considérés sous leur angle territorial, 
reflétaient en partie une répartition déformée de la compétence des effectifs et 
en partie les différentiels de salaire comme tels. Aussi cette constatation traduit-
elle le déplacement graduel de la négociation collective du niveau local au niveau 
régional, puis du niveau régional au niveau provincial au fil des années. La cen-
tralisation des mécanismes de négociation a inévitablement réduit les écarts de 
salaire. 
Par après, l'analyse a consisté à évaluer dans quelle mesure le degré de 
qualification des enseignants mesuré en fonction de ses brevets et de ses années 
d'expérience a tendance à modifier le taux moyen des salaires. En se fondant sur 
un échantillonnage des données pour les années 1970, 1971 et 1972, on a découvert 
qu'une bonne portion de la variation totale des taux moyens de salaire s'explique 
par ces deux facteurs, principalement le degré des brevets. Même si les données 
pour les années antérieures n'étaient pas disponibles, on a pu en déduire que, au 
cours de cette période de douze ans, les écarts qui existaient dans le degré de 
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qualification des enseignants se sont moins atténués que les disparités de salaire. 
En ce qui concerne la qualité de l'enseignement, les écarts de niveaux de com-
pétence constituent un enjeu plus important que les différences de salaire. 
Aussi, la troisième partie de l'étude porte-t-elle sur la répartition inégale des 
qualifications d'une localité à l'autre. À ce propos, on a exprimé l'hypothèse selon 
laquelle le niveau moyen des compétences dans une commission scolaire dépendait 
en grande partie de la capacité de payer de la municipalité scolaire. En réalité, 
plus une commission scolaire est capable de payer des traitements élevés, plus on 
y retrouve des enseignants compétents et expérimentés, alors que la commission 
scolaire plus pauvre ne peut se payer ce luxe. 
Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, on a établi certains modèles distincts de capacité 
de paiement pour les municipalités scolaires urbaines et pour les municipalités 
scolaires rurales, ceci du fait qu'elles possèdent des installations différentes. La 
capacité de payer des commissions scolaires urbaines fut établie en considérant 
le montant d'impôts scolaires perçus par élève et celle des municipalités scolaires 
rurales à partir de leurs revenus totaux, déduction faite du coût des transports 
des écoliers et de ce qu'il leur fallait verser à d'autres commissions scolaires. 
Dans les deux cas, la capacité de payer correspond d'une façon significative au 
niveau moyen de compétence du corps professoral, ce qui confirme notre hypothèse. 
Ce qui ressort clairement de la présente étude, c'est que, malgré des échelles 
de salaire qui tendent à s'uniformiser, les commissions scolaires prises individuelle-
ment sont en mesure d'influer sur le niveau moyen de compétence de telle manière 
qu'elles perpétuent un niveau équitable de qualification professionnelle d'une com-
mission par rapport à l'autre. En fait, sous le régime de la négociation provinciale, 
les différences de capacité de paiement entre les commissions scolaires locales 
n'ont guère d'influence sur les taux de salaire, mais, par contre, elles influeront 
sur la répartition du degré de compétence des enseignants tant que les municipalités 
scolaires prises individuellement percevront les impôts scolaires et détiendront le 
pouvoir d'embaucher et de congédier les enseignants. 
D'un point de vue politique, la conclusion de cette étude est claire. Pour 
arriver à une répartition plus uniforme de la compétence professionnelle, il est 
nécessaire d'uniformiser la capacité de payer. Le gouvernement provincial est bien 
placé pour atténuer les écarts dans la capacité de payer au niveau local en ajustant 
sa politique de subventions de telle sorte que des subsides plus généreux soient 
versés aux commissions scolaires qui, présentement, emploient des enseignants de 
moindre qualification. 
